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Abstract 
 
With no doubt the number of Mergers and Acquisitions (hereafter M&A) operations has been 
increasing through the last years. These deals often occur in global waves identified usually 
as an aggregate of specific industrial merger waves. The theoretical explanations and 
empirical studies for these events are vast, from stock market misevaluation to economic, 
technological or regulatory shocks. This study, supported by the neoclassical theory, leaves 
aside the explanation and focuses on the short-term returns inside the different industrial 
merger waves, comparing the gap between waves’ participants and non-participants returns, 
and comparing the first and latter movers’ returns within those waves. The theory suggests a 
timing advantage for the first movers inside an industrial merger wave, which somehow 
proves the possible existence of a bandwagon effect. Our results were positive regarding 
participants and non-participants returns, however, they showed a significant advantage for 
the latter movers contradicting previous works and also failing to support the bandwagon 
effect verification. 
Keywords: Bandwagon; mergers and acquisitions; short-term returns; post-acquisition 
performance; waves. 
JEL-Codes: G34.  
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Abstract (Portuguese) 
 
Sem dúvida alguma que o número de Fusões e Aquisições tem vindo a aumentar durante os 
últimos anos. Estas operações ocorrem frequentemente através de “ondas” globais 
normalmente identificadas como um conjunto de “ondas” de aquisições dentro de indústrias 
específicas. São inúmeras as teorias explicativas e os estudos de casos práticos para este tipo 
de eventos, variando desde avaliações incorrectas dentro do mercado bolsista a choques 
económicos, tecnológicos ou regulatórios. Este estudo é maioritariamente suportado pela 
teoria neoclássica e, deixando de lado todas as explicações teóricas, foca-se antes nos 
retornos de curto prazo dentro das diferentes “ondas” industriais. Comparando não só as 
diferenças nos retornos dos compradores que participam nessas “ondas” com aqueles que 
ficam de fora, mas assim como os retornos dos primeiros participantes com os dos últimos. 
A teoria sugere que existe uma vantagem para os primeiros participantes numa onda de 
aquisições dentro de uma indústria específica, o que de certa forma comprova a existência de 
um efeito bandwagon (efeito imitação). Por um lado, os nossos resultados foram claros no 
que toca à comparação entre os retornos dos participantes com aqueles dos não-participantes, 
mostrando uma patente vantagem para os primeiros. Contudo, e por outro lado, os resultados 
referentes à comparação dos retornos dos primeiros participantes com os retornos dos 
restantes mostraram uma vantagem estatisticamente significativa dos últimos, o que 
contradiz trabalhos anteriores. 
 
Palavras-chave: Bandwagon; fusões e aquisições; retornos de curto prazo; desempenho pós-
aquisição; “ondas”. 
 
JEL-Code: G34. 
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1. Introduction 
The theme of merger waves, per se, is a topic that through several theoretical or 
empirical studies was already much scrutinized in the finance history. The results seem to 
point out that most of the time mergers occur in waves (Brealey and Myers, 2003) defined as 
a set of specific industrial merger waves (Andrade and Stafford, 1999). 
After the proven existence of these events it seemed logical that questions about 
possible explanations would arise and the possible answers would consequently appear. From 
works such as Gort (1969), and more recently Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Harford 
(2005), neoclassical explanations were developed arguing that industry’s economic, 
technological, or regulatory shocks associated with high liquidity were in the foundations of 
industrial merger waves. 
Conversely, Shleifer and Vishny (2003), and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), 
argue that merger waves result mainly from a managerial advantage due to stock market 
overvaluation of their firms.  
 Considering the existence and the developing explanations for industrial merger 
waves some space is still open to evaluate the performance of companies participating in 
these waves, and furthermore comparing it with the performance of companies that chose to 
stay out of these events. 
 Even with the considerable extant research analyzing the impact of M&A on value 
creation for both acquirer and target companies, we still consider that the M&A literature 
should be constantly updated with relevant and original improvements, in order to better 
understand and improve companies’ decisions.    
 Despite the fact we present both the neoclassical and behavioral theory as 
explanations for merger waves, this event study takes its support mostly from the industry’s 
economic, technological (Mulherin and Boone, 200), financing innovations and regulatory 
shocks (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996), associated with sufficient capital liquidity to 
accommodate the assets reallocation (Harford, 2005),  as preeminent explanations for the 
abovementioned phenomena.   
Starting from the post-acquisition performance of acquiring firms in the short-term 
and then narrowing it to a more specific subject, as it is the case of industrial merger waves 
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the expectations are that it would be possible to measure and somehow explain how the 
market “inefficiencies” (whatever they are neoclassical or behavioural theory) are exploited 
by managers according their different timing in entering the market. 
When in an industrial merger wave some managers feel the pressure for entering the 
market as a response to their rivals. However, what should be a rational and conscious 
decision at times may be affected by copycat behavior characterized by following the 
industry tendency signaled by managers with different information and opportunities. This 
study purpose is to deepen into the bandwagon theory, (Pangarkar, 2000) a theory suggesting 
that firms will tend to imitate their close rivals regardless of whether such imitation is value-
enhancing or not. 
Regarding the first-mover advantage theory, other research has shown that the timing 
of participation in the wave is a matter of relevant importance, since early movers outperform 
later ones (Carow, et al., 2004; McNamara, et al., 2008). 
The natural intuition seems to provide first movers with competitive advantages and 
the later entrants with considerable disadvantages, however a specific firm must have certain 
competences and skills to do so, because depending on their unique traits, some firms might 
benefit from early entrance and others might benefit from following (Kerin, et al., 1992). 
Not exactly in the same position as a firm developing a new product or entering a 
new market, a first mover in an industrial merger wave is also endowed with the natural 
assumptions of higher abnormal returns however, is along with a series of tests, that it is 
expected to discover if that first mover advantage is real. 
 As the industrial merger waves, and consequently aggregate merger waves are 
defined, another simple question automatically emerges. Independently of first or later 
movers, is it advantageous to “surf” within a wave? It is hard to find empirical studies in this 
field, nevertheless analysing returns between financial operations within and without waves 
might be enlightening in which regards the managers’ concern about waves. 
 This last question will be briefly addressed as we try to reach some conclusions by 
globally comparing short-term returns of companies caught within M&A waves with market 
returns. Additionally, this work intends to answer to the following questions: 1) is timing 
relevant in M&A? 2) Could the first companies reacting to market inefficiencies take 
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advantage over the subsequent ones? 3) Is it possible that some managers feel the pressure of 
entering the market through M&A in response to their rivals regardless the operation creates 
value or not? 4) Is it advantageous for a company to participate in a wave? 5) Could the 
market inefficiencies exploited by firms “surfing” within a wave be observable in their short-
term returns? 6) What are the deal/firm characteristics that impact when a firm enters an 
industry merger wave? 
This study proceeds by using a sample of mergers and acquisitions from all the globe 
between 2005 and 2014, and across a range of industries to test the timing of entry in 
industrial merger waves within different geographies, economic development, means of 
payment, among others. Fundamentally, our first major contribution is to investigate if the 
early mover advantage (advantage from an acquisition that occurs in the beginning of an 
industrial merger wave) is somehow reflected in the shareholder’s returns. And if it is, in our 
second major contribution, we intend to test if those abnormal returns are still observable 
after controlling for the transaction characteristics namely, the mean of payment used (cash 
vs stock), economic growth (developed countries vs developing countries), size (large-cap 
firms vs small-cap firms), geographical scope (cross-border vs domestic), and industry 
relatedness (industry specialization vs industry diversification). 
We are trying to prove that part of the later entrants only run for this kind of financial 
operation as a response to their rivals, regardless of such reply creates value or not. 
The following section briefly reviews the most relevant literature related to our study. 
Chapter 3 presents the data and the methodology used to measure and compare the short-
term abnormal returns. Section 4 and 5 will respectively present the results and conclusions. 
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2. Literature review 
 In the first section, 2.1, we explain the definition and the differences between the 
different types of M&As. In section 2.2 we present the theory behind merger waves and the 
specific case of industrial merger waves. And we also discuss the results obtained by previous 
studies. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 leave aside the global perspective of M&A and focus on two 
main points of this study: the bandwagon effect, and the identification of industrial merger 
waves. In section 2.5 we consider the different methodologies and results of value creation 
studies in M&A, leaving for the section 2.6 the main conclusions regarding the more relevant 
factors determining acquirers’ returns. 
 
2.1. Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) 
According to Ross et al. (2013), an acquisition follows one of three different forms: 
merger or consolidation, acquisition of stock or acquisition of assets. 
In a merger, one firm absorbs the other, acquiring all its assets and liabilities. The 
acquiring firm retains its name and identity while the acquired, from that moment, ceases to 
exist. A consolidation is very similar to a merger; however, an entirely new firm is created 
with the termination of both the acquiring and acquired firm. 
 
2.2. Theory behind merger waves 
The existence of merger waves is clearly documented (see, e.g., Brealey and Myers, 
2003 and DePamphilis, 2010). The first wave began in the 19th century, in the 1890s to be 
more precise, and ended in 1903. The second wave occurred from the 1910s through 1929, 
closely following the end of the first wave, while the third took place between the 1950s and 
1973. The fourth and fifth waves materialized in the periods from 1981 to 1989, and from 
1993 to 2001, respectively. 
Also well-known is the proven existence of clustering waves within industries (see, 
e.g., Andrade, et al. (2001), and Mulherin and Boone (2000)) where they both play a 
‘contractionary’ and ‘expansionary’ role in industry restructuring (Andrade and Stafford, 
1999), invariably tied to two different explanatory concepts. 
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From the behavioural angle, Rhodes-Kropft and Viswanathan (2004) suggest that 
potential market value deviations from fundamental value on both positive and negative sides 
can rationally lead to a correlation between stock merger activity and market valuation; thus, 
valuation fundamentally impacts mergers. In the same line of thought, the model of stock-
market-driven acquisitions plotted by Shleifer and Visnhy (2003) seems to be consistent with 
the available empirical findings supporting the conclusion that firms with overvalued equity 
might be able to make acquisitions, survive and grow while firms with undervalued, or 
relatively less overvalued, equity become takeover target themselves. 
As in the work of Gort (1969), the neoclassical explanations for merger waves are 
based on economic disruptions that lead to industry reorganization. The results shown by 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) support the argument that much of the takeover activity during 
the 1980s was driven by broad fundamental factors such as technological, economic or 
regulatory shocks. More recently Harford (2005), through several tests, reinforced that 
industry shocks are the drivers for merger waves; however, whether the shocks lead to a wave 
of mergers will depend on whether there is sufficient overall capital liquidity in the market. 
 
2.3. Bandwagon effect 
The first-mover advantages seemed, somehow, a belief that would automatically lead 
to countless competitive gains but, as noted by Lieberman and Montgomery (1988, p. 52): 
[F]or any given firm, the question of whether early or late entry is more 
advantageous depends on the firm’s particular characteristics. If one firm has 
unique R&D capabilities while the other has strong marketing skills, it is in 
the interest of the first firm to pioneer and the second firm to enter at a later 
date. Both may earn significant profits entering in this sequence, but neither 
would gain if the (attempted) order of entry were reversed. 
The first-mover problem would never exist if it were not due to imitators. As Keyfies 
(1973) explains, people know that, in times of pressure or uncertainty as in the case of a 
merger wave, their individual judgment is not trustworthy, and they tend to fall back on the 
judgment of others whom they consider, perhaps, better informed. Thus, people tend to come 
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into compliance with the majority or the average. 
Several models have been advanced for capturing the essence of such behaviour. One 
of the terms that could better explain the manager’s attitude toward merger waves is mimetic 
isomorphism, as suggested by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), which according to them results 
from standard responses to uncertainty.  
The probability model for mimetic isomorphism presented by Tseng and Chou (2010) 
seems to point to an impact of institutional pressures on mimetic isomorphism in merger and 
acquisitions activity. Isomorphism refers to the tendency for firms within the same 
population, facing the same set of institutional pressures, to display the same behaviour 
mainly because the social pressures common to all managers in the same industry cause firms 
to exhibit similar structures and activities. 
As in many other economic situations, mimetic behaviour is present in mergers. 
Pangarkar (2000) identifies it as bandwagon effect and argues that firms will tend to imitate 
their close rivals regardless of whether such imitation is value-enhancing or not. 
It is assumed from the beginning that first movers would probably have advantages 
over the ones. To develop this argument, some event studies will be realized so we can 
compare the short-term returns between first and later movers.  
In the results given by the theoretical model developed by McNamara, et al. (2008), 
evidence was found that acquisition performance is higher for early movers but lower for 
acquirers that participate at the height of an acquisition wave. However, findings also suggest 
that both industry and acquirer characteristics affect the degree to which firms seize early-
mover advantages or fall prey to bandwagon pressures. 
 
2.4. Value creation in M&A 
 Whether mergers add value or not is a question that has been raised for a long time. 
In an M&A operation, value may be created, preserved or destroyed and, if we want to know 
whether in practice mergers actually create value or not, we should be ready to examine 
empirical evidence, as it is impossible to answer an empirical question in any other way. 
Though there exist several different ways of measuring value creation, the great majority of 
academics in the field tend to use event studies. These studies estimate abnormal returns on, 
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and around, the merger announcement date, comparing the actual returns with a market index 
or control group of stocks. 
  
2.4.1. Short-term and long-term returns 
There are many perspectives we could use to determine takeover success. They could 
vary from the perspectives of the target’s shareholders to those of any other stakeholders, e.g. 
bondholders, managers, employees and consumers. In this specific case, though, we are 
focusing on the bidder’s position, considering bidders as a company’s residual owners. 
Several studies have already proved that abnormal returns are a good indicator of 
acquisitions success (e.g., Healy, et al. (1992)) and, assuming the semi-strong form of 
information efficiency by Fama (1970) where the current price reflects all the past and 
present public information, short-term returns seem a plausible method to measure 
acquisition performance. 
To reach some conclusions about takeover profitability across the decade, it is 
necessary to find a suitable measurement model. In a careful review of the vast academic 
literature on the market for corporate control, Martynova and Renneboog (2008) presented a 
list of the major studies of returns across the last five merger waves. Diverse preferences 
regarding the benchmark return model and the event window from a number of different 
authors can be observed; thereby, the most apt method to compare the post-acquisition 
performance of acquiring firms is expected to be found. 
The studies focusing on the bidding firm’s stockholder returns are immense but, on 
average, abnormal returns realized by bidder shareholders at time of announcement are 
statistically indistinguishable from zero; in other words, they are not statistically significant 
(Andrade, et al. (2001)). In the first merger wave, Asquith (1983) and Eckbo (1983) report, 
there were positive abnormal returns close to zero (0.2% and 0.1%, respectively). For the 
second wave, Morck et al. (1990), Byrd and Hickman (1992), and Chang (1998) report 
negative abnormal returns also close to zero (ranging from -1.2% to -0.7%). And for the third 
wave, the findings of 17 different event studies are split almost evenly between positive and 
negative abnormal returns (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). 
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One explanation for such inconsistent results could be the different methodologies 
used by the researchers. Noteworthy pioneering studies have included those of Fama et al. 
(1969), using a methodology based on the Market Model (MM); Kummer and Hoffmeister 
(1978), who used the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) as benchmark return model; 
Asquish (1983), who introduced the Beta-Matched Control Portfolio (BMCP); and Dennis 
and McConnell (1986), who used the Market-Adjusted Model (MAM) as a reference point, 
in the short-term return of M&A. The abnormal return is the positive or negative difference 
between the actual returns and the benchmark. 
A benchmark should be used to rule out the impact of extraneous factors not related 
to the operation or the share price. Considerably more methodological problems emerge 
when long-term performance is evaluated, mainly because the company’s gains or losses 
could be affected by several different factors in the long term and it is almost impossible to 
completely isolate them. 
Following the work of McWilliams and Siegel (1997), who argue that it is more 
effective to use event studies than accounting studies, as stock prices are much less 
manipulable by managers than accounting returns, we have established as our goal to develop 
an event study about the short-term returns of acquiring firms. It is expected to compare the 
timing of the financial operation, not the general returns. Our ambition is to conclude whether 
there are significant return differences between the first movers and the later ones, and 
between the industrial merger wave participants and the non–industrial merger wave 
participants. 
 
2.4.2. Post-operating performance 
Apart from the abnormal returns measured by the short-term returns, other studies 
examine the post-operating performance of acquiring firms, usually based on a comparison 
between the accounting items or ratios preceding and following a takeover process. After the 
deal, a positive variation on the company’s cash flows is expected, which usually implies an 
increase in the firm’s value (Andrade et al., 2001). Such assessments include: return on equity 
(ROE), return on assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS), sales growth, total assets growth, 
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leverage growth, employment growth, market share, cash flows, and others (Martynova et 
al., 2008). 
 The main goal of this kind of study is to identify the sources of gains from M&A and 
to determine whether the expected gains/losses seen in the share price movements at the 
announcement are ever actually realized. Other studies compare the acquirer’s performance 
with other companies in the same industry. If the creation of value of an acquisition, through 
synergies or cost reduction, truly exists, the gains should eventually show up in the firm’s 
financial statements, specifically in the cash flow and income statement. 
 A problem materializes in this specific approach. Sometimes operating performance 
is affected, not merely by the takeover, but also by an array of other factors. Moreover, as 
pointed by Martynova and Renneboog (2008), it seems that an industry adjustment trend is 
necessary. Alternatively, one could compare the performance of merging companies with 
their non-merging peers, grouped by similar size and market-to-book ratio, prior and after 
the bid. 
 Martynova and Renneboog, 2008 accounted the combined operating gains of 
takeovers and found out that, from 26 different studies, 14 reported a post-merger decline in 
the operating returns of merged firms, 7 papers showed insignificant changes, and 5 provided 
evidence of a significant increase. Hereafter, we could conclude that the findings in this 
matter are not conclusive (Martynova et al., 2006). The inconclusive results can be partially 
explained by the different choices within a group of peer companies, i.e. benchmarking. 
 
2.5. Determinants of acquirers’ returns in the short term 
Whether we focus on theoretical or empirical M&A literature, both bodies have 
shown the existence of a variety of factors affecting the takeover announcement returns apart 
from synergies. Some empirical authors have found evidence that changes in bidder and 
target share prices in the short term, at the announcement date, could depend on the attributes 
of the M&A deal and the characteristics of the acquiring and acquired firms (Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2011). 
In the same work, the authors defend the hypothesis that takeover returns could also 
depend on the origin and the ownership structure of the bidding and target firm. The 
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following transaction attributes are likely to affect the acquirers’ and targets’ takeover 
returns: 1) the geographical scope of the bid—cross-border M&As are likely to benefit from 
imperfections in international capital, as compared with domestic M&As; 2) the form of the 
bid and the attitude towards it—unlike friendly takeovers, tender offers are frequently 
associated with lower takeover wealth effects for the bidder’s shareholders; 3) the legal status 
of the target firm—takeover bids on privately held companies may lead to bidders’ returns 
exceeding those obtained in the bids on public firms; 4) the industry relatedness of the bidding 
and target firms—although diversifying acquisitions are expected to create operational and 
financial synergies not seen in focus bids, the number of hitches created, such as rent-seeking 
behaviour by divisional managers, bargaining problems within the firm or bureaucratic 
rigidity, may outweigh the alleged synergies; 5) the type of acquisition—a partial acquisition 
(of less than 100% of equity) is likely to lead to lower takeover returns to the target’s 
shareholders than an acquisition in which a bidder obtains full control; 6) the means of 
payments—all-cash takeovers are expected to generate higher returns to the bidder’s and 
target’s shareholders than all-equity and mixed-offer; 7) deal transparency—whereas most 
bidding companies fully disclose the means of payment and transaction value, some 
companies conceal this information, and it is expected that the first type of deal will result in 
higher returns to the bidder’s and target’s shareholders than the second kind, as they may 
suspect that a non-transparent deal may lead to the expropriation of their rights either by the 
bidder’s management or by a controlling shareholder; and 8) the timing of the takeover—
reports show that takeover returns to the bidder’s shareholders decline during and after 
takeover wave peaks (Martynova and Renneboog, 2011).  
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3. Sample and Methodology 
To reach some relevant conclusions at the end of this event study, it is a matter of 
great importance to develop a complete and understandable database and methodology that 
would allow all the tests to be accomplished (MacKinlay, 1997). Taking a period of 10 years, 
from January 1, 2005 until December 31, 2014, different databases, such as Zephyr by 
Bureau Van Dijk and Datastream Professional by Thomson Reuters, all the information 
required to identify an industrial merger wave and to test our hypotheses has been gathered. 
 
3.1. Hypotheses 
 This section introduces our research hypotheses and points out the impact of M&A 
industrial waves on the market, as well as includes the comparison between first and latter 
entrants. 
 
3.1.1. Hypothesis I 
 The firms’ returns within an industrial merger wave are superior to those presented 
by the market. 
 
 It seems natural that a rational CEO or Board of Directors would only perform an 
acquisition when the possibility of value creation presents itself as likely. 
However, as presented in the Section 2.4.1, despite countless event studies in this 
matter there are no definitive answer regarding the positive or negative relation between 
M&A activity and abnormal returns. 
Regardless of our sample outcome, we cannot be sure that the results will only reflect 
the synergies created by the specific deal, as other variables may impact such results. 
Therefore, we have incorporated variables presented as relevant in previous works through 
the following regression: 
 
CARi(-t;+t) = α + ᵝ1 PAY + ᵝ2 IND + ᵝ3 EGROW + ᵝ4 SIZE + ɛi 
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Where, 
(-t;+t) – Correspond to the days around the announcement day, which define an event 
window. It may take the following values: (-10;+10); (-5;+5); (-3;+3); and (-1;+1).  
 
In the presented model, the dependant variable regards the Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR) of the acquirer companies, while the independent/explanatory variables are defined 
in the Table 1: 
 
Table 1. Variables definitions 
 
 
We use the variable PAY to test the means of payment hypothesis, or in other words 
if the acquirer tends to have better results (higher returns) in all-cash transaction or in other 
type of offers. In the case of all-cash offers have better performance than different types of 
acquisitions, this variable should show a positive sign. The variable IND is used to better 
understand the effects of specializations versus diversification so, if same industry 
acquisitions present better returns than the targeting of different industry firms the sign of the 
variable shall be positive. EGROW variable pretends to differentiate the transactions made 
by companies located in economies economically advanced (developed countries) from 
acquisitions made by companies in other geographies (non-developed and developing 
countries. If firms in developed economies take advantage over other firms the coefficient 
associated with this variable should be positive. Finally, the SIZE variable compares the 
returns of large acquirers with the returns of smaller ones. As some of the literature indicates, 
Variable Description
CAR Cumulative Average Returns of Acquirers within the event window announced.
PAY
Zero-one dummy variable taking the value 1 if the bid is all cash and 0 otherwise 
(shares or mixed).
IND
Zero-one dummy variable taking the value 1 if the bid is for a same industry 
company and 0 otherwise.
EGROW
Zero-one dummy variable taking the value 1 if the bid is made by a company in a 
developed country and 0 otherwise.
SIZE
Zero-one dummy variable taking the value 1 if the bid is made by a large company 
(Market Capitalization over $5 Billion) and 0 otherwise.
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for better results regarding small cap companies, the coefficient associated to this variable 
should present a negative value. 
 
3.1.2 Hypothesis II 
The returns presented by firms first entering an industrial merger wave are superior 
to those presented by the remaining companies. 
 
The entrance timing may affect acquirer returns. McNamara, et al. (2008) found 
evidence that first movers present better performance than the remaining ones. 
Taking into account the multiple linear regressiondeveloped in the previous section, a 
dummy variable was added to test the relevance of entering sooner in an industrial merger 
wave. The following equation summarize our test statistic: 
 
CARi(-t;+t) = α + ᵝ1 PAY + ᵝ2 IND + ᵝ3 EGROW + ᵝ4 SIZE + ᵝ5 ENTRYy + ɛi 
 
where, 
ENTRYy – is zero-one dummy variable taking he value 1 if the deal takes place earlier (yth 
percentile on entrance order) on a M&A industrial wave and 0 otherwise; 
y – may take the value of 50, 25, or 10 corresponding to Scenario I, Scenario II, and Scenario 
III, respectively. 
 
 
3.2. Industrial wave identification 
The identification of a possible existing industrial mergers followed a complex 
process: First, it was collected 1) all the acquisitions, mergers, institutional buy-outs, 
MBIs/MBOs, management buy-ins, and management buy-outs label as completed by Bureau 
Van Dijk’s Zephyr between January 1st, 2005 and December 31st 2014. Second, this data was 
categorized by sector based on the different Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, 
and sector/industrial merger was only considered in the case a minimum of 1,000 deals, over 
the 10-year period, in which the bidders have the same first two SIC algorithms. 
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For the identification of the industrial merger wave we have followed Mitchell and 
Mulherin (1996), which established a merger wave as a period of 2 years or 24 months, and 
Harford (2005), which simulated 1,000 different distributions of all the bids occurring over 
a 120-month period by randomly assigning each occurrence to a month where the probability 
of assignment is 1/120 for each month. Then, the highest 24-month concentration of activity 
was calculated from each of the 1,000 draws. Finally, Harford compared the actual 
concentration of activity from the potential wave to the empirical distribution of 1,000 peak 
24-month concentrations: if the actual peak concentration exceeded the 95th percentile from 
that empirical distribution, that period was coded a wave. 
 The level of maximum concentration for a 95th percentile reached by Harford (2005) 
was 27%, so, every time different industries from 2005 to 2014 had an M&A bid 
concentration of over 27% within any 24-month period, the interval was considered an 
industrial merger wave. 
 
3.3. Short-term returns 
A huge range of stakeholders are usually affected by an operation of this importance, 
from the target’s shareholder to bondholders, as well as managers, employees and consumers 
of both target and bidder companies, but the primary goal here is to understand and measure 
the effects linked to the bidder’s shareholders, being as they are the residual owners of the 
‘new’ company. 
Many types of event studies analysing short-term shareholders’ wealth effects have been 
developed since 1970 (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008), and taking into consideration the 
assumption of a semi-strong form of information efficiency by Fama (1970) where the 
current price reflects all the past and present public information, the short-term returns seem 
a plausible measure of the post-acquisition performance of the acquirer. 
 Every time an M&A deal happens, new information is brought to the market that 
changes the investor’s expectations about the future performance of the company, 
expectations consequently reflected in the share prices. For our purposes, only the impact 
caused by the operation needs to be accounted for; thus, an expected return (benchmark) is 
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needed. Though the Fama-French three-factor model is the most common benchmark, the 
CAPM, market model (MM) or market-adjusted model (MAM) can also be used. 
Two commonly used event windows for these event studies are the three days 
immediately preceding and following the merger announcement and the day itself (the seven-
day event window) and a longer one, beginning several days before the announcement and 
ending at the close of the operation (Andrade, et al., 2001). 
 
3.3.1. Measure of abnormal returns 
As in any other event study, using financial market data allows for measuring the 
impact of a specific event on the value of the firm (MacKinlay, 1997). Starting from this 
assumption, and taking into consideration the acquiring shareholder’s cumulative abnormal 
returns around the M&A’s announcement day, it is expected that the effects of that specific 
event would be immediately reflected in the security prices (Fama, et al., 1969). 
 Acknowledged as abnormal returns (AR) for each company (i) is the difference 
between the observed returns (R) and the expected returns (E(R)) at day t: 
 
ARi,t = Ri,t – E(Ri,t)   (1) 
 
A security’s price performance can only be considered ‘abnormal’ in comparison to 
a specific benchmark (Brown and Warner, 1980). Thus, it is necessary to define a model or 
models that generate ‘normal’ returns. For each different model considered, the excess return 
for a given security (i) in any period (t) is defined as the difference between its ex post return 
and that which is predicted under the assumed return-generating process. 
Mackinlay (1997) presents the constant mean return model and the market model as 
the two most common choices for modelling the normal returns. The first model, as the name 
implies, assumes that the mean return of a given security is constant through time, while in 
the second model, it assumes a stable linear relation between the market return and the 
security return. 
In addition to these methodologies, Brown and Warner (1980 and 1985) suggested 
another two different models to be used as benchmark, the market-adjusted return model and 
16 
 
the OLS market return model. Still following the work of Brown and Warner (1980), they 
conclude that a simple methodology based on the market model is both well-specified and 
relatively powerful under a wide variety of conditions, stating that in some cases even simpler 
methods also perform well. 
Using this information while complementing it with Martynova and Renneboog’s 
(2008) summary of short-term return effects around M&A announcements, we have decided 
to use both the market model (MM) and the market-adjusted model (MAM) as benchmarks, 
these being the most used regarding the measure of abnormal returns during merger waves. 
As explained before, the MM is a statistical model which relates the return of any 
given security to the return of the market portfolio. For any security i the market model is 
 
E(Ri,t) = αi + βi * Rm,t + εi,t  (2) 
 
assuming that: 
E(Ri,t) = expected return of the share of acquiring firm i on day t; 
αi = measure of average return of shares of acquiring firm i that it is not explained by the 
market; 
βi = measure of sensibility of the shares of acquiring firm i to market movements;  
Rm,t = return of market index on day t; and 
εi,t = stochastic error, Σεi,t = 0.  
 
 Our assumption, in this case, is the following: if the M&A operation was not 
announced, the difference between actual return and expected return on day t would be zero. 
However, in the situation of an M&A announcement deal, these returns should be different, 
and the abnormal returns (AR) of company i on day t is obtained as follows: 
 
εi,t = ARi,t = Ri,t – (αi + βi * Rm,t)  (3) 
 
Ri,t = actual return of the share of acquiring firm i on day t. 
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Figure 1. Timeline for an event study (Mackinlay,1997) 
The abnormal return observations must be aggregated to draw an overall inference 
for the event study (MacKinlay, 1997). The aggregation is made along two dimensions: 
through time and across securities. In the first case we consider an aggregation of an 
individual security through time. Here enters the concept of cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR); thus, the CAR of the acquiring firm i for a certain event window is the sum of all 
abnormal performance from day one until the last day of the window: 
 
CAR = ∑ 𝑨𝑹𝑻𝒕=𝟏 i,t  (4) 
 
Notwithstanding, tests with only one event observation are not likely to be useful, so 
it is necessary to aggregate across the different securities. For this aggregation, and since the 
securities and event dates were randomly selected, it is assumed that the abnormal returns 
and the cumulative average abnormal returns will be independent. Considering N as the 
number of companies, the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) for acquiring firms 
are calculated as: 
 
C𝐀𝐀𝐑 =  
∑ 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝑵𝒊=𝟏
𝑵
   (5)  
 
To develop the framework where we are going to work, it is important to mark out 
some notations to facilitate the measurements and analysis of abnormal returns. We define 
day ‘0’ as the announcement day for a hypothetical M&A operation for a given company. 
The announcement day will happen within the event window (period between T1 and T2), 
which precedes the estimation window (the period from T0 to T1) and precedes the post-event 
window (the period between T2 and T3). 
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Event windows change across different researchers, and consequently across the 
different studies on post-acquisition performance in the short term. For example, the post-
event window will not be considered due to the lack of statistical relevance of long-term 
abnormal returns as reported by Campa and Hernando (2004). 
Brown and Warner (1985) set for each security the use of a maximum of 250 daily 
return observations for the period around its respective event; however, as it is typical for the 
estimation window and the event window not to overlap so that the parameters of the normal 
return model are not affected by the returns around the event, it was decided to established a 
period of 250 days (civil year) for the estimation window, from day -280 to day -30, and a 
period of 60 days to the event window, between the day -30 and the day +30. 
Despite the 60 days-period established as the event window, mainly due to the 
problematic situation that could arise if both the normal returns and the abnormal returns 
were to capture the event impact, we are expecting to test the abnormal returns only for 
shorter periods. The 7-day event window (-3, +3) is the most commonly used but, in addition 
to that, it is our intention to test the 3-, 11- and possibly the 21-day event window ([-1, +1]; 
[-5, +5]; [-10, +10] respectively), in order to diminish biases and better assess the impact of 
M&A operations. This is shaky ground to trample as a too-small event window may exclude 
information released before the announcement, while an extended window may mistakenly 
include previous or future movements in the acquiring company’s stock price (Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2004). 
The use of an extended estimation window (250 days) is due to the assumption that 
the MM parameters are constant over the window. Each of the MM parameters will be 
estimated using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method obtained through a logarithm 
transformation to approximate the returns to normality (Henderson, 1990): 
 
?̂?i,t= 𝒍𝒏(
𝑷𝒕
𝑷𝒕−𝟏
)   (6) 
 
𝑹𝒎,?̂? =  𝒍𝒏(
𝑰𝒕
𝑰𝒕−𝟏
)  (7) 
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where 
Pt = market price of the share of acquiring firm i on day t; 
Pt-1 = market price of the share of acquiring firm i on the day before day t; 
It = index price on day t; and 
It-1 = index price on the day before day t. 
 
For the event study we are going to use the MSCI World Index as a proxy of the 
market return as our sample includes acquiring firms listed in different markets worldwide. 
As noted before, the event window will not coincide with the estimation window; therefore, 
the estimated MM parameters will not be affected by event returns. It is assumed that the 
abnormal returns capture, totally, the announcement impact. The equation below represents 
the expected return: 
 
𝑬(𝑹𝒊,𝒕) =  𝜶?̂? +  𝜷?̂? ∗  𝑹𝒎,𝒕  (8) 
 
Besides the market model (MM), we will also estimate returns using the market-
adjusted model (MAM). MAM is a market model with restrictions, where the company risk 
is not accounted – the expected return is equal to the market return (α = 0 and β = 1). This 
specific model does not require estimation of any parameters, so there is no need for the 
designation of an estimation window. 
 
𝑬(𝑹𝒊,𝒕) =  𝑹𝒎,𝒕  (9) 
 
Given the logarithm transformation assumed, we have considered that the individual 
firms’ abnormal returns are normally distributed. Therefore, if the null hypothesis is rejected, 
we may conclude that ‘surfing’ within an industrial merger wave has a direct impact on 
shareholders’ wealth. To do so, the standard statistic test is presented as follows: 
 
𝒕 =  𝑪𝑨𝑹?̂? / 𝑺(𝑨𝑹?̂?)  (10) 
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where, 
𝐶𝐴𝑅0̂ = (1/N) ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖0
𝑁
𝑖=1 ; and 
𝑆(𝐴𝑅0̂) is an estimate of standard deviation of the average abnormal returns σ(𝐴𝑅0̂). 
 
However, considering the different event window lengths of our sample, we have 
sought support from the work of Serra (2004) to test whether CAAR equals zero or not, 
through the multi-week T-student test statistic presented below, subsequently adapted to a 
sample comprising daily returns: 
 
𝒕 =  𝑪𝑨𝑹?̂? / √𝑺𝟐(∑ 𝑨𝑹𝒍̂
𝑳
𝒍=𝟏 )  (11) 
 
where, 
l denotes the weeks (days in the present event study) in the event window. 
 
 
Assuming independence over time, we have: 
𝑺𝟐(∑ 𝑨𝑹𝒍̂
𝑳
𝒍=𝟏 ) = ∑ 𝑺
𝟐(𝑨𝑹?̂?
𝑳
𝒍=𝟏 )  (12) 
where, 
𝑺𝟐(𝑨𝑹?̂?) =  √
∑ (𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕− 
∑ 𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕𝒕
𝑻
)𝟐𝑻𝒕=𝟏
𝑻−𝒅
   (13) 
And the statistic is distributed as Student-t with T-d degrees of freedom. However, 
the standard deviation presented (13) fails to account for autocorrelation in average abnormal 
returns over the event window, usually leading to an underestimation of the multi-week 
variance (Serra, 2004). 
 
3.4. Sample 
A total of 252,621 deals was obtained in the first sample extracted. When distributing 
the data by industry and through the 120 months, we did not find enough concentration in 
any of the 24-month periods across most of the 85 possible industries. Therefore, a change 
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in the methodology was required so it would be possible to identify industrial merger waves.  
As a major methodology change, we dropped counting the number of deals for a 
concentration measure, using instead the value of each transaction. We considered as an 
industrial merger wave the 24-month period between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 
2014, with maximum value concentration, provided that the period in question has a value 
of deals larger than 27% of the total value of deals during the 10-year timeframe. For the 
sample we had to restrict the number of deals, counting only transactions with known values, 
reaching a total of 90,397 deals. A final total of 19 industrial merger waves was identified. 
Then, the Datastream database was used to gather all deals included in the criteria 
initially presented. The data are based on the sample adopted to identify the industrial M&A 
waves plus some different criteria. Apart from the four conditions presented before, we will 
consider only deals: (i) in which the value is disclosed; (ii) where the acquirer company is 
listed on the announcement day; (iii) with value of at least 5% of the acquirer’s value, so as 
to be considered relevant; (iv) where the acquirer becomes a majority shareholder of the 
target company; and (v) that involve the acquisitions of at least 20% of total target’s shares. 
Considering all the criteria mentioned, we were left with a total of 388 different deals. 
 Next, to every deal was attributed an entrance timing within the wave where it belongs. 
For that we have used the first sample (gathered in Zephyr database) that includes all deals 
occurred in one of the identified waves. In the end, the time of entrance in a wave (according 
to the announcement date) was defined for the 388 deals. 
From here, and with the help of Datastream database, we obtained the share price for 
each of the 388 acquiring companies for the 10-year period along with the movements of 
MSCI Index World over the same period. 
Only acquiring companies with known share prices for the 280 days before the 
announcement date were considered. At this stage 28 deals were dropped from the study. 
Despite all these constraints, the sample still comprises acquirers from the most 
diverse areas around the globe with a particularly strong representation in Europe and 
Asia/Pacific. The geographical area distribution was considered in both value and number of 
deals, as represented in Figure 2, respectively. 
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The sample obtained is concentrated mostly during the years 2006 and 2007, 
exceeding 170 transactions and reaching almost 70 billion euros, 48% and 69% of the total 
number and value of the deals, respectively. As expected, following the 2008 crisis there was 
a decrease in M&A activity in both number and value, which seems to have been recovering 
in the last years (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Time horizon deal distribution by number and value 
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Figure 2. Geographic deal distribution by value and number 
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Table 2. Main deal characteristics distributed by geographical area 
The Table 2 shows the deal distribution by means of payment, industry relatedness, 
geographical scope, acquirer’s economic growth and acquirer’s size. The sample is 
represented by 42% of all-cash and same-industry deals, while being completely dominated 
by 100% cross-border deals. The developed countries present the larger part of the acquirer 
companies (71%), signalling a specific financial availability from the strongest economies. 
In terms of size, 272 deals (approximately 76% of the total sample) are comprised by 
companies with a market capitalization below $1 billion. 
 
 
 
  
Africa / Middle 
East
Asia / Pacific Europe
Latin America 
and Caribbean
United States 
and Canada
Total
Panel A: Means of Payment
All-Cash 6 70 63 4 7 150
All-Equity, Mixed, and others 13 80 95 11 11 210
Panel B: Industry Relatedness
Specialization (same industry) 6 61 65 9 11 152
Diversification (other industry) 13 89 93 6 7 208
Panel C: Geographical Scope
Cross-Border 19 150 158 15 18 360
Domestic 0 0 0 0 0 0
Panel D: Acquirer's Economic Growth
Developed Countries 7 72 157 0 18 254
Developing Countries 12 78 1 15 0 106
Panel E: Acquirer's Size
Large-Cap 1 33 47 5 2 88
Mid-Cap and Small-Cap 18 117 111 10 16 272
Source: Own calculations based on Zephyr, United Nations
Acquirer's Region
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4. Results 
This section, under Hypothesis I, presents the effects of M&A operation in acquirer 
companies during industrial merger waves, comparing as abovementioned, the combined 
firm share prices over the following event windows: [-10;10], [-5;5 ], [-3;3]; and [-1;1], using 
both the MM and MAM. Apart from that, control variables such as: i) mean of payment, ii) 
economic growth, iii) size; iv) industrial relatedness will be introduce in our analysis with 
the purpose of strengthen the assumption that the participation in industrial merger waves is 
the main explanation for the abnormal returns. 
In the Hypothesis II we pretend to test, for the same event windows, if within 
industrial merger waves there are advantages for the first movers. Using both the MM and 
MAM approaches it will be compared the abnormal returns of the first i) half, ii) quarter, and 
iii) tenth firms to “surf” within the wave against those of the remain companies. 
Considering that the final sample of our work comprises 360 complete deals, which 
have taken place during different 280-days periods (estimation window + event window + 
post-event window) across the 10-year period under analysis. We had to develop an Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) regression for each of the cases in order to calculate the abnormal returns 
for all the transactions. 
 
4.1. Hypothesis I 
 The results presented in this section intend to explain the behaviour of our sample 
when compared to the market performance. 
 
4.1.1. Descriptive and test statistics 
 In the Table 3, the results shown by our sample confirm a positive relation between 
participants in industrial merger waves and better short-term performance. Conversely to the 
literature presented in the “Short-term and long-term returns” section, bidders’ returns are 
statistically significant. 
 However, the differences between the means and the medians presented may indicate 
the presence of relevant outliers amongst our sample. 
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[-10;+10] [-5;+5] [-3;+3] [-1;+1] [-10;+10] [-5;+5] [-3;+3] [-1;+1]
CAAR 0.0484*** 0.025*** 0.0168*** 0.0109*** 0.0653*** 0.0511*** 0.046*** 0.0305***
Median (CAR) 0.0066*** 0.0046*** 0.0029*** 0.0028*** 0.0315*** 0.0299*** 0.0246*** 0.0146***
Std. Deviation (CAR) 0.153 0.089 0.057 0.043 0.193 0.148 0.115 0.092
Positive CAR (#) 217 218 232 218 215 219 238 236
Observations 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360
Source: Own calculations
t-statistic fo llows a t-student distribution. ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level for a two-tailed test.
Event window (days)
MM MAM
Table 3. Summary of descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 However, to control for the possibility of considerable outliers we performed the non-
parametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, in order to understand if the samples’ median was 
statistically distinguishable from zero. Therefore, considering our medians, the sample 
presented positive abnormal returns for every event window with a 99% of confidence level. 
These results appear to be more conclusive than the ones related in the previous works. 
In previous waves Asquith (1983) and Eckbo (1983) reported positive returns close to zero 
for the shareholders of acquiring firms, while Morck et al. (1990), Byrd and Hickman (1992) 
and Chang (1998) reported negative abnormal returns also close to zero. 
   
4.1.2. Model and independent variables 
 Besides the expected synergies, we have gathered some of the factors affecting 
mergers’ returns, such as method of payment, industry relatedness, bidder size, and 
economical environment. In this section we are trying to test the strength of the main 
characteristics, and in which level they may affect acquirers’ performance. 
 
4.1.2.1. Univariate analysis 
 In this section of our work we have developed a set of univariate analyses where we 
have separated our sample in different sub-groups. Despite the statistically significance of 
our results, the standard deviations presented and the differences between the means and 
medians show us that there must be a relevant dispersion amongst the data gathered. 
 Therefore, in order to test the median statistical significance for every situation, a one 
sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank test was performed. 
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4.1.2.1.1. All cash and other method of payment 
 Table 4 shows us that for larger event windows the acquisitions using other methods 
of payment besides all-cash present better results. However, in the event windows closer to 
the announcement date this effect disappears. In future works, it could be interesting to test 
if it is due to the expectations created before the announcement or after, computing the results 
for the [-5;+1] and [-1;+5] event windows, respectively. 
 When testing for the assumption of a non-parametric sample (Wilcoxon Ranked Test), 
the acquirers’ returns continue to favour the merger wave’s participant. Regarding the returns’ 
differences between all-cash and non-all-cash operations, across the different event windows, 
the results show a behaviour similar to the one presented by the means. 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for all cash and other methods of payment bids 
 
 
4.1.2.1.2. Industry relatedness and industry diversification 
 In the table 5 we can observe that, in both benchmark models, the industry 
diversification strategy outperforms the industry specialization for the larger event window. 
Nevertheless, this effect is completely reversed for shorter event windows. Thus, we think 
that the suggestion for testing different event windows presented in the previous section 
would also be pertinent in this case. 
 
[-10;+10] [-5;+5] [-3;+3] [-1;+1] [-10;+10] [-5;+5] [-3;+3] [-1;+1]
All-cash
CAAR 0.0515*** 0.0506*** 0.0503*** 0.0384*** 0.0507*** 0.0489*** 0.0483*** 0.0369***
Median (CAR) 0.0214*** 0.0217*** 0.0235*** 0.0135*** 0.0319*** 0.0288*** 0.0307*** 0.0181***
Std. Deviation (CAR) 0.171 0.129 0.105 0.096 0.162 0.120 0.100 0.087
Observations (#)
Other method of payment
CAAR 0.0811*** 0.0582*** 0.0509*** 0.0305*** 0.0757*** 0.0527*** 0.0443*** 0.0259***
Median (CAR) 0.0278*** 0.0205*** 0.0173*** 0.0093*** 0.0306*** 0.0302*** 0.0213*** 0.0103***
Std. Deviation (CAR) 0.249 0.176 0.145 0.108 0.213 0.165 0.124 0.096
Observations (#)
Source: Own calculations
t-statistic fo llows a t-student distribution. ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level for a two-tailed test.
Event window (days)
MM MAM
150
210
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics for industry related and industry diversified bids 
 
 
4.1.2.1.3. Large bidder and small bidder 
 In this section, we have tested the effect of the bidders’ market capitalization on the 
returns around the announcement date. Considering the Table 6, it can be observed that 
smaller bidders present better results than larger ones, for each one of the event windows 
analysed. 
 Nonetheless, these consideration are more evident in larger event windows, as both 
the CAAR and the median (CAR), of the larger bidders are losing statistical significance as 
the time period increases  
 The results are consistent with Banz (1981) where he finds a negative correlation 
between average returns and the market capitalization of the stocks. 
 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics for larger bidders and small bidders 
 
 
[-10;+10] [-5;+5] [-3;+3] [-1;+1] [-10;+10] [-5;+5] [-3;+3] [-1;+1]
Industry relatedness
CAAR 0.0616*** 0.0596*** 0.0526*** 0.0338*** 0.0536*** 0.0523*** 0.0456*** 0.0309***
Median (CAR) 0.0202*** 0.0207*** 0.0162*** 0.0098*** 0.0177*** 0.0274*** 0.0221*** 0.0183***
Std. Deviation (CAR) 0.205 0.173 0.134 0.111 0.195 0.162 0.127 0.099
Observations (#)
Industry diversification
CAAR 0.0741*** 0.0517*** 0.0492*** 0.0338*** 0.0738*** 0.0502*** 0.0462*** 0.0302***
Median (CAR) 0.0276*** 0.0214*** 0.0189*** 0.107*** 0.0346*** 0.0329*** 0.0275*** 0.0128***
Std. Deviation (CAR) 0.231 0.146 0.126 0.097 0.192 0.138 0.105 0.087
Observations (#)
Source: Own calculations
t-statistic fo llows a t-student distribution. ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level for a two-tailed test.
Event window (days)
MM MAM
152
208
[-10;+10] [-5;+5] [-3;+3] [-1;+1] [-10;+10] [-5;+5] [-3;+3] [-1;+1]
Large bidder
CAAR 0.043** 0.0404** 0.0396*** 0.0228** 0.0568*** 0.0458*** 0.0419*** 0.0251**
Median (CAR) 0.0195* 0.0093* 0.0114*** 0.0059** 0.0316*** 0.0226*** 0.0159*** 0.0132***
Std. Deviation (CAR) 0.165 0.143 0.116 0.095 0.164 0.138 0.111 0.090
Observations (#)
Small b idder
CAAR 0.0771*** 0.0597*** 0.0542*** 0.0374*** 0.068*** 0.0528*** 0.0473*** 0.0322***
Median (CAR) 0.0278*** 0.0232*** 0.0232*** 0.0112*** 0.0315*** 0.0318*** 0.025*** 0.0149***
Std. Deviation (CAR) 0.235 0.163 0.134 0.105 0.202 0.151 0.116 0.093
Observations (#)
Source: Own calculations
t-statistic fo llows a t-student distribution. ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level for a two-tailed test.
Event window (days)
MM MAM
88
272
28 
 
4.1.2.1.4. Developed country and developing country 
It is expected that the greater risk inherent to more volatile economies such as 
developing countries should be compensated through a bigger premium. This rational is 
strengthened by the results introduced by Table 7 where, acquirers’ returns from developing 
countries exceed the returns presented by bidders headquartered in developed countries. 
 
Table 7. Descriptive statistics for bidders from developed and developing countries 
 
 
4.1.2.2. Model summary 
The effect of all the explanatory variables was tested by running the multiple 
regression developed under the Hypothesis I, for the event window [-3;+3]1 and using the 
MM as benchmark. 
The results presented in the Table 8 show that only the economic environment has 
significant power to explain the acquirers’ CAR. 
With a statistical significance level of 5%, it suggests that the level of development 
of the acquirer’s country has a negative “statistically significant” effect on shareholders’ 
value. Saying that and considering our sample, bidders located in developing economies 
perform better than the ones based on developed countries. 
                                                 
1 The regression has also been conducted for the other event windows. However, given the length of the larger 
window (21 days), in which the results may be affected by other variables, and considering the similarity of 
results or absence of statistical significance of the other windows, such results were not presented. 
[-10;+10] [-5;+5] [-3;+3] [-1;+1] [-10;+10] [-5;+5] [-3;+3] [-1;+1]
Developed country
CAAR 0.0596*** 0.0464*** 0.0409*** 0.0294*** 0.0514*** 0.04*** 0.0353*** 0.0252***
Median (CAR) 0.0279*** 0.0199*** 0.0145*** 0.009*** 0.0309*** 0.0261*** 0.0191*** 0.0128***
Std. Deviation (CAR) 0.197 0.150 0.122 0.106 0.170 0.144 0.107 0.092
Observations (#)
Developing country
CAAR 0.0907*** 0.0757*** 0.074*** 0.0444*** 0.0986*** 0.0778*** 0.0715*** 0.043***
Median (CAR) 0.0136** 0.0237*** 0.0253*** 0.0162*** 0.0319*** 0.037*** 0.0387*** 0.0198***
Std. Deviation (CAR) 0.268 0.017 0.175 0.096 0.237 0.156 0.127 0.092
Observations (#)
Source: Own calculations
t-statistic fo llows a t-student distribution. ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level for a two-tailed test.
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Nonetheless, the explanatory strength of the independent variables in the model is 
low. As we may observe in the regression (7) only 1.6% of the acquirer’s CAR can be 
explained by them. 
The positive and statistical significant value of the constant reinforce our previous 
results, therefore highlighting the advantages of “surfing” within an industrial merger wave. 
There are no evidence regarding collinearity2 within our independent variables (see 
Annex 4), nor even the variables’ coefficients changed the signal or significance level as new 
variables were added to the single regressions. 
Despite most of the coefficients presented were not statistical significant, the results 
may, at some level, be compared with the literature reviewed. In our sample all-cash deals 
negatively affect the acquirers’ CAR, conversely with the presented by Franks et al. (1991), 
Leeth et al. (2000), and Martynova et al. (2011) where all-cash deals outperform the other 
methods of payment. 
Regarding industry relatedness, our results point out in the direction of previous 
works. As in Morck et al. (1990), Leeth et al. (2000), and Martynova el al. (2011), when 
compared to industry diversification, focused bids seem to positively affect acquirers’ returns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 The correlation matrix between explanatory variables is presented in Annex 4.  
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Variable
Event window (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PAY -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
IND 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.003
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.14)
SIZE -0.015 -0.015 -0.013
(0.016) (0.014) (0.16)
EGROW -0.033** -0.032**
(0.015) (0.15)
(Constant) 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.074*** 0.0490*** 0.053*** 0.076***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016)
Observations 360 360 360 360 360 360 360
R-Squared 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.014 0.000 0.003 0.016
Adjusted R-Squared -0.003 -0.003 0.000 0.011 -0.005 -0.006 0.005
F-statistic 0.002 0.06 0.839 4.932 0.031 0.322 1.408
Prob(F-statistic) 0.969 0.806 0.36 0.027 0.97 0.809 0.231
Source: Own calculations.
Notes: Standard deviation presented under parenthisis. ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level. Regression (1) presents the effect of payment method in the bidders' CAR [ -3;+3]. 
Regression (2) presents the effect of industry relatedness in the bidders' CAR[-3;+3]. Regression (3) presents the effect of the firm's size in the bidders' CAR[-3;+3]. Regression (4) presents 
the effect of acquirers' country of origin in the bidders' CAR[-3;+3]. Regression (5), (6) and (7) present other combinations of the previous variables.
MM
The table presents the effect of a set of variables on the acquirers' returns
Coefficient
Table 8. MM multiple regression of acquirers' CAR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2. Hypothesis II 
Taking into account the multiple linear regression3 developed in the Section 3.1.2, 
the following sections 4.2.1., 4.2.2., and 4.2.3. present the results of the comparison between 
the first entrants returns and the returns of the remaining companies,  for 3 different scenarios 
(below detailed), and in 4 different event windows [-10;+10], [-5;+5], [-3;+3] and [-1;+1]. 
After adding the timing variables, and in line with the model presented in the previous 
section, the constant presents a positive and statistical significant value, thus supporting the 
advantages of participating in industrial merger wave. 
 
4.2.1. Scenario I 
The returns presented by firms entering in the first half of an industrial merger wave 
are superior to those presented by the remaining companies. 
The results for the first scenario are presented in the Table 9: 
                                                 
3 In this section, we are only presenting the results of the multiple regression using the MM as benchmark. The 
results for the regression using the MAM are presented in the annexes. 
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Variable
Event window [-10;+10] [-5;+5] [-3;+3] [-1;+1]
PAY -0.034** -0.015 -0.010* -0.002
(0.016) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005)
IND -0.012 0.008 0.002 0.003
(0.016) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005)
SIZE -0.027 -0.008 -0.005 -0.002
(0.019) (0.011) (0.007) (0.005)
EGROW -0.03* -0.006 -0.005 0.003
(0.018) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005)
TIMING_50 -0.036** -0.021** -0.010* -0.009*
(0.016) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005)
(Constant) 0.111*** 0.043*** 0.03*** 0.013**
(0.019) (0.011) (0.007) (0.005)
Observations 360 360 360 360
R-Squared 0.042 0.026 0.020 0.013
Adjusted R-Squared 0.029 0.012 0.007 -0.001
F-statistic 3.120 1.900 1.473 0.926
Prob(F-statistic) 0.009 0.094 0.198 0.464
Source: Own calculations.
Notes: Standard deviations presented under parenthisis. ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level.
MM
The table presents the effect of the entry timing on the acquirers' returns
Coefficient
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results show that, for all the event windows, the coefficient associated to the 
dependent variable related to the entry time is negative and statistically significant. These 
results suggest that the value created by first 50% of firms “surfing” within an industrial 
merger wave are different of the returns presented by the remaining companies. However, 
surprisingly, the value created by the first movers is lower than the ones presented by the 
latter movers. 
We believe that the absence of a bandwagon effect, on one hand may be due to the 
current semi-strong form of market efficiency. In this form of efficiency, the market reflects 
all the publicly information (Fama, (1970)), however the first movers shall possess private 
information regarding the industry’s specificities, which will only be reflected in the market 
prices after the first deals are completed. Thus, at this moment, we cannot be sure that the 
returns of latter entrants are entirely due to the merger synergies. 
Table 9. MM Multiple regression for Scenario I 
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On the other hand, we presented a sample “divided” in two groups across the different 
scenarios, (i) first entrants and (ii) all the remaining companies. Considering that the division 
between first movers and latter movers is not completely clear, this method may implicate 
that some of the first mover advantages are being reflected in the group of remaining firms. 
To partially removed this effect, in future works we may only compare the industrial 
merger tails, e.g. first 10% entering the market vs. last 10% entering the market. 
 
4.2.2. Scenario II 
The returns presented by firms entering in the first quarter of an industrial merger 
wave are superior to those presented by the remaining companies. 
The results for the second scenario are presented in the Table 10: 
 
Table 10. MM Multiple regression for scenario II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable
Event window [-10;+10] [-5;+5] [-3;+3] [-1;+1]
PAY -0.036** -0.015 -0.01* -0.003
(0.016) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005)
IND -0.010 0.009 0.002 0.003
(0.016) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005)
SIZE -0.028 -0.008 -0.005 -0.002
(0.019) (0.011) (0.007) (0.005)
EGROW -0.032* -0.007 -0.006 0.003
(0.018) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005)
TIMING_25 -0.015 -0.014 -0.006 -0.004
(0.020) (0.012) (0.007) (0.006)
(Constant) 0.100*** 0.037*** 0.027*** 0.010*
(0.019) (0.011) (0.007) (0.005)
Observations 360 360 360 360
R-Squared 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.005
Adjusted R-Squared 0.152 0.002 0.000 -0.009
F-statistic 2.239 1.141 0.974 0.342
Prob(F-statistic) 0.050 0.338 0.433 0.887
Source: Own calculations.
Notes: Standard deviations presented under parenthisis. ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level.
MM
The table presents the effect of the entry timing on the acquirers' returns
Coefficient
33 
 
Our sample did not present the statistical power to assure that a difference between 
the returns of the first 25% of firms “surfing” within an industrial merger wave and the 
returns of the remaining firms exists. In this scenario we could not prove that the existence 
of an advantageous or disadvantageous position for the first movers.  
 
4.2.3. Scenario III 
The returns presented by firms entering in the first tenth of an industrial merger wave 
are superior to those presented by the remaining companies. 
The results for the third scenario are presented in the Table 11: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is no statistical significance between the difference of the returns presented by 
the very first firms engaging in M&A deals and the remaining companies. Despite the small 
Table 11. MM Multiple regression for Scenario III 
Variable
Event window [-10;+10] [-5;+5] [-3;+3] [-1;+1]
PAY -0.036** -0.016 -0.011* -0.003
(0.016) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005)
IND -0.010 0.009 0.002 0.003
(0.016) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005)
SIZE -0.029 -0.008 -0.005 -0.002
(0.019) (0.011) (0.007) (0.005)
EGROW -0.032* -0.008 -0.006 0.003
(0.018) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005)
TIMING_10 -0.016 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.028) (0.016) (0.010) (0.008)
(Constant) 0.099*** 0.035*** 0.026*** 0.010*
(0.018) (0.011) (0.007) (0.005)
Observations 360 360 360 360
R-Squared 0.030 0.012 0.013 0.005
Adjusted R-Squared 0.016 -0.002 -0.001 -0.009
F-statistic 2.198 0.891 0.928 0.346
Prob(F-statistic) 0.054 0.487 0.463 0.885
Source: Own calculations.
Notes: Standard deviations presented under parenthisis. ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level.
MM
The table presents the effect of the entry timing on the acquirers' returns
Coefficient
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differences are not statistically significant, for all the event windows the ᵦ of the ENTRY 
variable has a negative value, in accordance with both Scenario I and Scenario II. 
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5. Conclusion 
The present study investigates and seeks to offer a further understanding of the 
dynamics in the M&A sector, namely within industrial merger waves. Considering that those 
merger waves occur due to economic disruption that leads to industry reorganization 
(neoclassical approach) we have follow the work of several other authors to conclude if such 
increase in M&A activity would have befallen in recent years. 
From 2005 to 2014 we have concluded that there was not, in almost any period, such 
a concentration in the number of mergers by industry4 that we could comprehend as a wave. 
However, we found that there were intense peaks of M&A concentration, during some 
periods, when measured by the value of each deal. Despite not all the deals’ values were 
available, the approach used allowed us to identify 19 industrial merger waves during the 10-
year period, result in line with the existence of industrial merger waves. 
Regarding the acquirers’ returns of the participants in industrial merger waves, the 
results present positive and strong statistically significance across the different event 
windows and different benchmark models. Fundamentally converging to the statistical 
significance of the positive acquirer firm performance associated with prior works (Morck et 
al. (1990), among others). 
In what concerns the model tested, we have found that the control variables affect the 
acquirer’s returns at a very low level. However, the results present statistical significance 
related with economic environment of the acquirer’s country. Firms based on developing 
countries positively affect the cumulative abnormal returns, when compared to firms 
headquartered in developed economies. As there was no reliability behind the companies’ 
results (entry time vs control variables) some of the cases first selected for the comparison 
during the wave progression were removed. 
Finally, and surprisingly, the only statistically significant results revealed in the 
hypothesis II of this study presented an increase in the returns as an acquisition’s wave 
progress, contradicting the historical evidence presented by other authors, such as McNamara 
et al. (2008). 
                                                 
4 Methodology used by Harford  (2005) 
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Concerning future research recommendations, we believe that focusing in the most 
important M&A markets such as USA, UK, or EU, instead of using a worldwide sample, 
would be easier and more accurate to manage the control variables and better understand the 
real impact of industrial merger waves in the acquirers’ returns. 
Additionally, we believe that the economic, technological or regulatory shocks that, 
according to the neoclassical theory, are the reason for the occurrence of industrial merger 
waves, would probably impact the industry’s returns. These shocks, besides allowing for the 
merger wave to happen, would probably signal a sector’s undervaluation.  
Moreover, as the increase in value is not immediately reflected in the market prices, 
the positive returns showed by latter acquirers may be due to the expected industry gains and 
not from the acquisitions per se. This correlation between acquirer’s returns within industrial 
merger should be accounted for.  
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Annexes 
 
Annex 1 
MAM Multiple regression for Scenario I. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable
Event window [-10;+10] [-5;+5] [-3;+3] [-1;+1]
PAY -0.025 -0.004 0.003 0.011
(0.021) (0.016) (0.012) (0.010)
IND -0.023 0.000 -0.003 0.000
(0.021) (0.016) (0.012) (0.010)
SIZE -0.008 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005
(0.024) (0.016) (0.014) (0.011)
EGROW -0.045** -0.035** -0.034* -0.016
(0.022) (0.017) (0.013) (0.011)
TIMING_50 -0.043** -0.037** -0.02* -0.019*
(0.020) (0.016) (0.012) (0.010)
(Constant) 0.138*** 0.095*** 0.079*** 0.046***
(0.024) (0.019) (0.014) (0.012)
Observations 360 360 360 360
R-Squared 0.033 0.030 0.015 0.021
Adjusted R-Squared 0.019 0.016 0.114 0.007
F-statistic 2.379 2.157 2.097 1.542
Prob(F-statistic) 0.038 0.580 0.650 0.176
Source: Own calculations.
Notes: Standard deviations presented under parenthisis. ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level.
MAM
The table presents the effect of the entry timing on the acquirers' returns
Coefficient
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Annex 2 
MAM Multiple regression for Scenario II. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable
Event window [-10;+10] [-5;+5] [-3;+3] [-1;+1]
PAY -0.027 -0.005 0.003 0.010
(0.021) (0.016) (0.012) (0.010)
IND -0.021 0.001 -0.002 0.000
(0.021) (0.016) (0.012) (0.010)
SIZE -0.008 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005
(0.024) (0.018) (0.014) (0.011)
EGROW -0.048** -0.037** -0.036*** -0.017
(0.022) (0.017) (0.013) (0.011)
TIMING_25 -0.013* -0.012 0.004 -0.006
(0.025) (0.020) (0.015) (0.012)
(Constant) 0.124*** 0.082*** 0.071*** 0.040***
(0.024) (0.018) (0.014) (0.011)
Observations 360 360 360 360
R-Squared 0.021 0.015 0.021 0.012
Adjusted R-Squared 0.007 0.001 0.007 -0.002
F-statistic 1.534 1.091 1.537 0.871
Prob(F-statistic) 0.178 0.365 0.178 0.501
Source: Own calculations.
Notes: Standard deviations presented under parenthisis. ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level.
MAM
The table presents the effect of the entry timing on the acquirers' returns
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Annex 3 
MAM Multiple regression for Scenario III. 
  
Variable
Event window [-10;+10] [-5;+5] [-3;+3] [-1;+1]
PAY -0.027 -0.006 0.003 0.010
(0.021) (0.016) (0.012) (0.010)
IND -0.021 0.001 -0.002 0.001
(0.021) (0.016) (0.012) (0.010)
SIZE -0.009 -0.006 -0.003 -0.006
(0.024) (0.018) (0.014) (0.011)
EGROW -0.048** -0.038** -0.036* -0.016
(0.022) (0.017) (0.013) (0.011)
TIMING_10 -0.02 -0.003 0.001 -0.02
(0.035) (0.027) (0.021) (0.017)
(Constant) 0.123*** 0.081*** 0.072*** 0.041***
(0.023) (0.018) (0.014) (0.011)
Observations 360 360 360 360
R-Squared 0.021 0.014 0.021 0.015
Adjusted R-Squared 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.002
F-statistic 1.540 1.020 1.525 1.113
Prob(F-statistic) 0.176 0.405 0.181 0.353
Source: Own calculations.
Notes: Standard deviations presented under parenthisis. ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level.
MAM
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Annex 4 
Correlation matrix between explanatory variables. 
 
  
 
  
PAY IND SIZE EGROW
PAY 1.000 0.008 -0.087 -0.035
IND 0.008 1.000 0.103 -0.040
SIZE -0.087 0.103 1.000 0.055
EGROW -0.035 -0.040 0.055 1.000
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SIC II Description No Value max concentration period value of max con. Per. %
10 Coal mining 2.035 441.374.476 jul-06 a jun-08 154.905.233 35%
13 Oil and gas extraction 2.969 1.130.087.183 mai-05 a abr-07 343.828.704 30%
15 Building construction-general contractors and operative 
builders
1.313 164.515.894 jul-05 a jun-07 84.894.966 52%
16 Heavy construction other than builing construction-
contractors
1.187 137.152.680 jul-05 a jun-07 73.718.075 54%
20 Food and kindred products 2.647 602.898.869 mar-08 a fev-10 184.289.426 31%
27 Printing, publishing and allied industries 1.369 171.541.670 jan-05 a dez-06 78.933.900 46%
33 Primary metal industries 1.139 204.239.508 jun-05 a mai-07 126.326.227 62%
34 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
transportation equipment
1.140 128.566.638 set-10 a ago-12 45.235.442 35%
36 Electronic and other electrical equipment and components, 
except computer equipment
2.965 345.436.493 out-12 a set-14 141.780.523 41%
38 Measuring, analysing and controlling instruments, 
photographic, medical and optical goods, w atches and 
clocks
1.364 161.387.983 ago-05 a jul-07 59.425.666 37%
48 Communications 2.889 1.008.011.404 jan-05 a dez-06 380.943.170 38%
49 Electric, gas and sanitary services 2.014 568.584.371 jan-06 a dez-07 226.300.800 40%
50 Wholesale trade, durable goods 2.281 107.243.825 out-06 a set-08 33.225.109 31%
60 Depositary institutions 3.262 1.310.609.643 jun-05 a mai-07 622.167.315 47%
62 Security and commodity brokers, dealers, exchanges and 
services
2.633 518.272.790 set-06 a ago-08 147.556.044 28%
65 Real estate 3.290 393.601.557 dez-05 a nov-07 159.493.615 41%
67 Holding and other investment off ices 17.870 2.302.651.945 set-05 a ago-07 928.117.597 40%
73 Business services 6.991 401.732.257 out-12 a set-14 120.631.291 30%
87 Engineering, accounting, research, management, and 
related services
1.383 75.310.770 nov-06 a out-08 29.556.025 39%
Annex 5 
Summary of the data gathered. 
 
